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ARGUMENT 
L RESPONSE TO GONZALEZ'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gonzalez did not dispute any of the facts detailed in RSC's Brief of Appellant. 
However, Gonzalez's Brief of Appellee contains a version of "facts" which are disputed by 
RSC, but have no bearing on whether the trial court erred when: (1) it ruled that RSC, due 
solely to its status as a general contractor, was liable as a possessor of land under 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §384; and (2) it erroneously ruled that the Gonzalez's 
Amended Complaint sufficiently alleged a premises liability claim against RSC. The 
aforementioned errors are questions of law for this Court to determine. See, Salt Lake City 
v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995) ("A trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal one and will be reviewed for 
correctness. Therefore, all issues in this case will be reviewed de novo, giving no deference 
to the trial court's conclusions.")(internal citations omitted). Additionally the trial court's 
interpretation "of prior precedent, statutes, and the common law are questions of law that we 
review for correctness." See, In re Estate of Ostler, 2009 UT 82 ^ f 7. 
Notwithstanding Gonzalez's attempt to create issues of fact by presenting a one-sided 
version of the same, this Court is not being asked to weigh issues of disputed fact. Rather, 
this interlocutory appeal requests this Court to determine whether the trial court erred as a 
matter of law when: (1) it ruled that RSC, due solely to its status as a general contractor, was 
liable as a possessor of land under Restatement (Second) of Torts §384; and (2) it 
1 
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erroneously ruled that Gonzalez's Amended Complaint sufficiently alleged a premises 
liability claim against RSC. Accordingly, RSC requests that, to the extent that Gonzalez's 
statement of facts do not address the legal issues noted above, this Court not consider the 
same. 
IL THE PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED "DIRECT NEGLIGENCE" CLAIMS 
ARE ILLUSORY AND INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CLAIMS 
PROPERLY DISMISSED BY UTAH COURTS. 
Gonzalez urges this Court to ignore the long established general rule in Utah that "the 
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by 
an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, ^ f 13, 
979 P.2d 322. While Gonzalez attempts to creatively circumvent this well established legal 
rule by characterizing his claims against RSC as "direct negligence" claims, Gonzalez's 
attempts to do so are illusory and are nothing more than an exercise in creative semantics. 
Gonzalez readily admits that his allegations of "direct negligence" as contained in his 
amended complaint are based in premises liability. See, Brief of Appellee at 13. While 
Gonzalez's attempt to re-cast his allegations as "premises liability" claims will be addressed 
in further detail in III and IV, infra, as will be demonstrated below, none of Gonzalez's 
allegations are properly characterized as "direct negligence" that would fall outside Utah's 
retained control doctrine. 
As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 
2009 UT 45 122, 215 P3d. 143, the retained control doctrine "...recognizes that one who 
2 
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hires an independent contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which 
the contractor's work is performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety or the manner 
or method of performance implemented." (citing Thompson, 1999 UT 22, f 13)(emphasis 
added)). The commonly accepted reason for the aforementioned rule is that, where the 
principal employer does not control the means of accomplishing the contracted work, the 
sub-contractor "is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility for preventing the 
risk [arising out of the work], and administering it and distributing it." Id. (quoting Prosser 
& W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed. 1984)(emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that Gonzalez was injured while installing soffit and fascia on the 
north side of building four. (Record 838). It is further undisputed that JCC was responsible 
for supervising its employees, was responsible for the safety equipment JCC employees 
utilized, and had complete control over the method and manner in which it performed its 
work on the Project. (Record 839 - 840). Finally, it is undisputed that on the day of his 
injury, the only workers present at building four were Gonzalez and his two co-workers. 
(Record 836). RSC was not present at the jobsite on the date of the injury, and was unaware 
of JCCs presence on the Project. (Record 836). 
While Gonzalez argues that RSC is liable for his injuries because of the manner of the 
building's construction or overall site safety, similar arguments have consistently been 
rejected by Utah Appellate Courts and are not considered "direct negligence" claims. For 
example, mSmith v. Hales Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App. 38, this Court addressed the 
3 
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issue of whether the "injury causing aspect of the work" relates in a broad overall sense, /. e., 
all similar activities on a construction project, or in a narrow sense, i.e. only over the activity 
which caused the injury: 
Plaintiffs argue that in this case "control over the manner" of the "injury-
causing aspect of the work" relates broadly to all carpentry activities, 
including framing, of the church. On the other hand, Defendants urge a 
more narrow view of the "injury-causing aspect of the work," as 
including only the manner of framing the wall that fell on Decedent. The 
trial court interpreted "injury-causing aspect" narrowly, finding that 
neither H & W nor CPB "exerted control over the means utilized by" the 
framers "at the time of the [ajccident" We agree with the trial court that 
under Thompson, retained control requires active participation in the 
method or operative detail of the injury-causing activity in order to 
impose liability. 
Id at \ 10 (emphasis added). 
Both RSC and Gonzalez have cited to Magana in support of their positions. 
Consequently, a thorough review of the Magana case is necessary to properly address the 
issues before this Court. From the outset, it is important to recognize that the Utah Supreme 
Court in Magana upheld both this Court and the trial court's determination that all of 
Magana's claims, except for one, were barred by retained control doctrine. The sole 
surviving claim in Magana concerned Magana's allegation that the general contractor's 
supervisor directly participated in the negligent rigging of a load of trusses, i.e. negligently 
rigged the load of trusses himself 
Gonzalez's theory of "direct negligence" is dependant upon his novel premises 
liability claim. In articulating his "premises liability" claim Gonzalez specifically directs this 
4 
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Court to subsections (a), (^ ) and (h; of Paragraph 28. See, Brief of Appellee at 29 30. 
Gonzalez argues that his "direct negligence" claims are similar to the sole surviving claim 
Complaiiit and the Aiiiended Complaint1 filed ii i Ma^tr^ = UMM-J • V -I : 
the Gonzalez Amended Complaint and the Magaiia .Amended ( omplaint follows below: 
GONZALEZ 
; A tf28 
' (a) Failing to properly exercise and 
•aintain a place of employment 
.! \vas free from recognized 
. ards that were IikeK U ,aiise 
i death or serious bodily harm. 
r~ " 
/) Failing to ensure that the 
* *velopment of the Property diu 
){ encroach upon the electrical 
m-s iining the Property, or that 
oper safety measures were 
i-nved, including cutting of! 
H nver to the power lines, 
Milating the electrical lines, and 
protecting the 10 foot safety circle. 
^h) Allowing people to work on 
mproperly constructed seal folding 
<:ni/or scaffolding erected less 
:
 feet away from operative 
< oltage electrical lines when 
•c\ knew or should then and there 
listed, have known that it was 
•":2cnus an:1 unsafe to d • < • 
\ 1 U * V \ ^ 
Addendum + i; * -.n 
(A) Failure to properly maintain .? 
safe construction site. 
•. h) failure to enforce safety rule> 
..•'.d procedures on the eonstructioi 
site. 
(^) Failure to properK inspect the 
>>ad before lifting it 
•-
;)) Failure to propch -•• . 
* -gging proceduie. 
(!•* i- ailure to oversee the proper use 
f slings for the load being lifted 
:ud'or the condition^. 
11 ) failure to keep the load from 
overhead the workers (sic). 
! (]) Failure to disclose and warn of 
Known dangers. 
:
 k) Failure to cm re^ . 1- — 
hazardous condition 
Ri failure to warn of the dangerous 
condition that then and there existed 
i 
Dismissed 
in 
Mag^al 
v rc 1 
1 
. 
\ true and correct copy of the Amended Complaint in Magana is was provided to the 
trial i ourt. (Recoid 1113 1133;. 
5 
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As noted above, in Magana, the only issue that remained for the trial court was 
whether "[defendant's supervisor] indeed assisted in the rigging of the load of trusses that 
slipped and fell on Magana is a question of fact regarding [defendant's supervisor's] direct 
negligence." Magana, 2009 UT 45, f^ 39 (emphasis added). None of the remaining claims 
in Magana, including, inter alia, the failure to properly maintain a safe construction site, the 
failure to disclose and warn of known dangers, the failure to correct a known hazardous 
condition or the failure to implement and follow safe work policies and procedures were held 
by the Utah Supreme Court to constitute "direct negligence." 
Unlike the instant case, the direct negligence claim in Magana originated from the 
general contractor's supervisor's alleged direct participation in rigging the load of trusses that 
fell on Magana. While the Gonzalez claims that RSC "failed to take reasonable steps to 
make the premises safe for subcontractors," the Utah Supreme Court specifically stated that 
the general contractor in Magana "did not owe Magana a duty to ensure that [Magana's 
employer] conducted the off-loading process safely." Id. at f 35. The Magana Court's 
conclusion further illustrates what constituted the defendant's "direct negligence." Because 
of its clear application to this case it is quoted at length: 
The court of appeals correctly held that DRC, through its agent 
Campbell, did not retain control of the off-loading of the truss joists by 
determining where to place the walls of the restaurant, deciding with 
Circle T where to off-load the lumber on-site, hiring the crane company 
that assisted in the off-loading, bearing responsibility for on-site safety, 
and directly participating in rigging the second load of truss joists. In 
each instance, Magana's claims either exceeded the scope of the injury-
causing aspect of Circle T's work or failed to meet the active 
6 
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participation standard. But the active participation standard, does not 
apply to Magana's direct negligence theory. By asserting that Campbell 
himself negligently rigged the truss joists, Magana's negligence claim 
exceeds the scope of the retained control doctrine because the assertion 
relates to Campbell's acts, and not the acts of Circle T. Further, Magana's 
testimony that he witnessed Campbell rig the second load is sufficient to 
create a factual issue as to direct negligence. Therefore, we reverse the 
court of appeals1 decision and remand this case to the dwtrj.-t , nun for 
liirther proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Id. at % 40 (emphasis added). 
L .i^' jcjici ;i a}i:Lu.u;i m Ma^ufiu K.V ui»] not participate in J "CC's soffit and 
fascia work (R\'0'v • -. .•:**. I K J J J I K * > r 
even present and working on building 4 at the Lime o, the accident. (Record 6?< 
asserting that RSC was negligent because it did. not warn JCC or take precautions to ensure 
•n:i' • « \ • :, ,s . .K , was perfoi.iica :^uci>, Ooiizdlez n t^empts to 
impermissibly shift JCC's responsi^i-' ,. , ,
 (. , 
responsibility for preventing the risk" to RSC. See, Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 
509 (V1" cd. 19K4). i lowever I Jtah law is clear that RSC, "owes no duty of care concerning 
the safely oi tlk. nidiuici ui memod of performance o\ JLL /S soffit and, fascia, work. 
Mag ana, 2009 UT 45, % 23 (emphasis added). ' 
U adopted by this Court,, Gonzalez's premises liability argument would directly 
undermine the holding in Magana and other retained, control cases and would impose new" 
and onerous duties i xpon general conti actoi s in I ) tali I "' :>i example, the following claims 
properly dismissed in Magana, would under Gonzalez's now! flicwv consiitnlo "ilinvl 
7 
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negligence": (1) the failure to properly maintain a safe construction site, (2) the failure to 
disclose and warn of known dangers, (3) the failure to correct a known hazardous condition, 
and (4) the failure to implement and follow safe work policies and procedures. Similarly, the 
claims against the general contractor in Begaye v. BigD Const Corp. 2008 UT 4,178 P.3d 
343, would have constituted "direct negligence" under Gonzalez's premises liability 
argument. See, Begaye v. BigD Const. Corp. 2008 UT 4 at <|[ 5 fh. 2. ("Begaye also argues 
that Big D had a contractual duty to provide a safe work environment and is therefore liable-
as a matter of law-for injuries sustained by a subcontractor.") However, both this Court and 
the Utah Supreme Court have consistently held that, "...one who hires an independent 
contractor and does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work 
is performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety or the manner or method of 
performance implemented." Id. at f 22 (citing Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, ^ 
13)(emphasis added). Because it is undisputed that RSC did not participate in Gonzalez's 
work and indeed, was not even present on the day of the accident, RSC could not have been 
"directly negligent" as outlined in Magana. Based upon the foregoing, RSC is entitled to a 
reversal of the trial court's decision and RSC should be granted summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
III. PROXIMITY TO HIGH VOLTAGE OVERHEAD POWER LINES IS A 
RISK INHERENT IN GONZALEZ'S WORK. 
In advocating for the adoption of § 384, Gonzalez claims that all jurisdictions that 
have considered § 384 have adopted it. However, Gonzalez reluctantly acknowledges that 
8 
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only three states of the 22 states cited by Gonzalez haw applied \^K4 in tin1 nidiim i 
advocated here, See, Brief of Appellee at 23. The remaining 19 cases Gonzalez cited to the 
tna: • sM\.. ii,, Oivuvi nii.dJh>. ..niidren'or other third party members of the public not an 
employee of a si ibcontractoi W h ile Gonzalez still claims "[ I ]he o \ erwhelming weight of 
authority across the country," is in his favor, the fact that ov\\ • h: v states ha\ r • . * *-
inthemamier suggested by Gonzalez and the potential ramifications on prior Utah precedent 
siioaki give uii^ ^ ouri pause. . >\ us (tohnmwi,. Restatement §384 imposes certain duties for 
' » A\\\ • *!-i '• • * : . - , s . ::-. : ' , riiis language is inipoi'tanl I he Utah 
Supreme Court has already examined similar Restatement iam:;:aiH and l"iiml lli.i! 
"[S]ections 41.3, 416, and 427 each speak of liability fV "njur\ u: others/ which implies 
third parties rather than employees of the independent contractor carrying out the contracted 
WOfK " Human, i: ^i}' ' ' < :> • - i p - v s h L i • .- •.. .,.- .-, i . Mv' ; s n t 
cited above, Gonzalez argues (for the first time inhis appeal) that the risk he en. ,v • • • 
the jobsite was not a risk inherent in his work. See, Brief of Appellee at 24. llo\\e\e:, db 
• • *• ,i-. nionsiiau.-j ouiow, viunzaiez's argument that tnc risk at issue was not inherent in 
Gonzalez's woi l dirtv.llv ronlradicls ( jon/altv 's ni<Miinrandiiui ni nppnsitmn i< ^unmiiirv 
judgment and should be rejected by tins Court. 
Gonzalez readily admits that "when risks 'inhere to the manner in which the work is 
done' ' it is more i easonable and promotes saiety lo require the subcontractor to protect itself 
from such risks." See. Brief* of Apprlln ,il '(Mi.|iiolmg I lioinpsoii IWL) III )1. ]\ ill n 
9 
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Further, Gonzalez acknowledges, "Why should a general contractor have to protect a 
subcontractor from a risk that is part and parcel of the very job for which the subcontractor 
was hired?" See, Brief of Appellee at 24. Finally, Gonzalez concedes that "Sorensen's 
concern.. .might have merit if the alleged duty involved liability for a risk inherent in the 
work, which risk should be allocated to the subcontractor/worker himself." Id. (emphasis 
added). Notwithstanding these admissions, Gonzalez astonishingly claims that even though 
Gonzalez's work primarily consisted of installing long lengths of conductive metal siding, 
soffit and fascia on buildings while utilizing tall metal ladders, proximity to power lines and 
the associated dangers therewith are not dangers that are inherent in his work. Id. at 20,24. 
Gonzalez's argument is absurd on its face, contradicts the position taken in his opposition 
to summary judgment and should be rejected by this Court. 
The first case that addressed the inherent risk issue was Dayton v. Free, 148 P. 408 
(Utah 1914). In Dayton, the Plaintiff was employed as a miner by Stewart Mining Company. 
The Plaintiff was working on a mine owned by Snake Creek Mining and Tunnel and operated 
by Free & Taylor. The Plaintiff was drilling into the face of the mine when he struck a 
"missed hole", an explosive which had misfired, and was injured when the hole detonated. 
He sued the owner of the mine (Snake Creek) and the operator of the mine (Free & Taylor): 
The alleged negligence is that the defendants failed and neglected to 
notify or warn him of the missed hole, by reason of which he was injured 
while he and others, without knowledge of the missed hole, were drilling 
holes at the face of the tunnel. 
Id. at 409. 
10 
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In affirming judgment for the defendants, the Utah Supreme Court held that the hazard 
of a "missed hole" was a danger incident to the work for which the defendants owed no duty 
of protection: 
And, as has been seen, it having neither reserved nor exercised direction 
or control over the work, or the time or manner of doing it, it owed him 
no duty to provide a safe place to work, or to warn or notify him of 
missed holes, or to guard him against dangers incident to or created by 
the prosecution of the work, and certainly not to guard or protect him 
against the negligence of those who had employed him or with whom he 
labored. 
Id. at 412. (emphasis added). Eighty-five years later, based in large measure on Dayton v. 
Free, the Utah Supreme Court decided Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, the seminal case in 
Utah regarding the retained control doctrine. 
In order to counter nearly one hundred years of Utah case law, Gonzalez argues for 
the first time in his appeal that the risk of coming into contact with a high voltage power line 
is not a risk inherent in his work. This argument is a sweeping departure from Gonzalez's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment wherein Gonzalez argued that RSC 
should have anticipated the harm, notwithstanding the fact that the risk was inherent to 
Gonzalez's work. In his memorandum in opposition Gonzalez acknowledged: 
In this instance, it is clearly foreseeable that while in the course of doing 
the soffit and fascia and (sic) Jose may have been distracted or forgotten 
a high voltage power line was nearby. 
In describing the last-named scenario (the "deliberate encounter 
exception"), Hale cited as an example the very situation present here: a 
worker whose job requires him to encounter a dangerous condition. 
11 
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Similarly, a jury could reasonably conclude that Sorensen should have 
anticipated that a subcontractor, who has to work in the immediate 
vicinity of the power line, holding large objects or tools in his hands, 
might inadvertently come into contact with the power line. 
(Record 850)(emphasis added). 
RSC submits that Gonzalez's new argument on appeal both departs from and 
contradicts the argument contained in his memorandum in opposition to summary judgment 
and should be disregarded by this Court. See, Pratt v. City Council, 639 P.2d 172,173-74 
(Utah 1981)("Issues not raised [before the lower court] cannot be raised on appeal.") 
To further his new argument, Gonzalez provides this Court with several "straw man" 
examples, rather than address the obvious, i.e., that a subcontractor that installs long pieces 
of conductive metal while standing on conductive ladders or scaffolding high above the 
ground faces several risks inherent in the same, including the potential for contacting a high 
voltage overhead power line. The first "straw man" attempts to limit Gonzalez's risks 
inherent to the tools he uses, "Gonzalez's injury had nothing to do with the method or 
manner in which soffit is installed - Gonzalez did not injure himself by using a nail gun 
improperly, for example." See, Brief of Appellee at 17. This "straw man" ignores other 
inherent risks associated with Gonzalez's work. For example, because Gonzalez was 
working high above the ground, both proximity to power lines and falling are risks inherent 
in his work. In this case, Gonzalez climbed upon another trade's scaffolding without 
permission and failed to wear any fall protection or to protect against a high voltage power 
line. (Record 884) Indeed, arguing that RSC created the risk due to the proximity of the 
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building to the power line is akin to arguing that RSC created the risk of Gonzalez falling due 
to the building's height. This "straw man" example should be disregarded. 
The next "straw man" attempts to limit the dangers working near power lines to only 
those workers that are working directly on the line itself, "If Gonzalez had been hired to 
repair or sleeve the power, then proximity to the lines would be inherent to his work." Id. 
at 20. Much like the first straw man, this argument unreasonably limits an inherent risk to 
only those workers that worked on the power line itself. The case of Hillabrand v. Drypers 
Corp., 2002 WL 31260045 (Ohio Ct. App., October 10,2002)(unpublished), a case cited by 
both RSC and Gonzalez in support for their respective positions2 is instructive. 
In Drypers, Drypers Corporation ("Drypers") hired Holt Roofing ("Holt") to perform 
a roof repair on a commercial building Drypers occupied and leased from another entity. The 
plaintiff was a supervisor of Holt and was injured when, while standing on the roof, he threw 
metal debris into a dumpster positioned below. A piece of metal debris inadvertently made 
contact with a power line causing an electrical flash which injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
brought suit against Drypers, claiming that Drypers negligently positioned the dumpster 
below energized power lines. Drypers moved for summary judgment based upon the retained 
control doctrine, which was granted by the trial court. In affirming the trial court, the Ohio 
2
 Gonzalez argues that the Drypers case supports their argument that another court has 
"recognized that retained control and premises liability as separate theories of liability 
against a general contractor." See, Brief of Appellee at 22. However, Gonzalez fails to 
mention that, much like the "general contractor/owner" in Hale v. Beckstead, the "general 
contractor" in Drypers was also the lessee of the property in question thus making a 
premises liability analysis more appropriate. 
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Third District Court of Appeals held that proximity to overhead power lines was a danger 
inherent in roof repair. M a t 5. 
The final "straw man" is the most obvious. Gonzalez claims that "It was not inherent 
in the job for Gonzalez to encounter an unreasonably close power line on the site any more 
than it would have been inherent for him to encounter a pit of spikes." Id. at 24. While 
Gonzalez does not indicate how often subcontractors on construction sites encounter a "pit 
of spikes", it is reasonable to conclude that subcontractors that work high above the ground 
encounter power lines on a regular basis. Indeed, a common phrase directed towards not 
only construction professionals, but to the public at large, is "Look up before you go up." 
Indeed, this final "straw man" argument completely ignores Gonzalez's previous argument 
to the trial court that notwithstanding the fact that Gonzalez knew of and appreciated the risk, 
RSC should have anticipated that Gonzalez "who has to work in the immediate vicinity of 
the power line, holding large objects or tools in his hands, might inadvertently come in 
contact with the power line." (Record 850). 
As pointed out above, Utah law has long recognized that the employer of the injured 
worker has the most knowledge of the work to be performed, the risks inherent in the same 
and is in the best position to assess and control the safety precautions for its employees. 
Gonzalez's argument would serve to diminish worksite safety rather than promote it as it 
advocates taking the primary safety responsibility from the subcontractor most 
knowledgeable with the work and its particular hazards and places it in the hands of the 
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general contractor. Consequently, Gonzalez' premises liability argument, while beneficial 
to Gonzalez, would ultimately make Utah construction projects less safe and should be 
explicitly rejected by this Court. 
IV. GONZALEZ'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID NOT ADEQUATELY 
PLEAD A PREMISES LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Gonzalez claims that his amended complaint "plainly stated" a premises liability claim 
against RSC. However, a review of the allegations and claims in the Gonzalez's amended 
complaint clearly demonstrates that the claims in Gonzalez's complaint are anything but 
"plainly stated." Although Utah R. Civ. P. 8 does not demand that a complaint be a model 
of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged, it does require, at a minimum, that a 
complaint give each defendant fair notice of the plaintiffs claim[s] against it and the grounds 
upon which the claim[s] rest. See, Utah R. Civ. P. 8; Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990 
(1962). The amended complaint filed by Gonzalez utilizes a "shotgun" pleading format that 
lumps all of the defendants together in each cause of action and provides no factual basis to 
distinguish their conduct. For example Gonzalez's first cause of action states that, 
"Defendants breached their duty of care to Plaintiff by, among other things...." (Record 130) 
Paragraph 28 of the amended complaint then enumerates nine allegations (a - i) one of which 
(d) contains five subparts towards the "Defendants," not to solely to RSC. (Record 130 — 
131) Gonzalez's amended complaint does not differentiate which allegation relates to which 
defendant; instead, Gonzalez alleges the same conduct against all defendants irrespective the 
actual applicability of the same. 
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In a case like this, where multiple defendants are involved and many factually distinct 
claims are raised, the amended complaint should at a minimum contain specific allegations 
with respect to each defendant. Generalized allegations that lump multiple defendants 
together without specifying which defendant is targeted by which allegation is insufficient 
to permit the any one defendant, or the Court, to ascertain exactly what is being alleged and 
against whom. See, Gauvin v. Trornbatore, 682 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D.Cal.1988) 
(lumping together of multiple defendants in one broad allegation fails to satisfy notice 
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)); Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.Supp. 277,284 
(E.D.Wis.1975) ("Specific identification of the parties to the activities alleged by the 
plaintiffs is required in this action to enable the defendant to plead intelligently."); Atuahene 
v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed. Appx. 33 (2d Cir.2001)("[b]y lumping all the defendants together 
in each claim and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct, [plaintiffs] 
complaint failed to satisfy this minimum standard...."). 
As a consequence of Gonzalez's failure to distinguish his allegations among the 
several defendants, it is nearly impossible for RSC or this Court to accurately discern the 
factual underpinning of each claim. Indeed, most of the claims in Paragraph 28, above, are 
facially inapplicable to certain defendants and violate Utah R. Civ. P. 11. For example, 
Gonzalez lacks a rational basis, much less a factual basis, to allege that Rocky Mountain 
Power breached a standard of care related to the erection of scaffolding; however, 
Gonzalez's complaint alleges just that. While Gonzalez claims that his complaint "plainly 
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stated" a claim for premises liability against RSC, to accept this argument, this Court would 
also have to conclude that Gonzalez's complaint "plainly stated" a premises liability claim 
against Rocky Mountain Power and the stucco subcontractor, R.M. Rees Construction. 
Furthermore, any claim for premises liability asserted against any defendant other than 
Orchard Vista, the property's owner, is facially deficient as a matter of law because 
Gonzalez's amended complaint fails to allege that any defendant other than Orchard Vista 
owned or possessed the property. See, Hevelone v. City Market, Inc., 2005 UT App. 215 
("Hevelone's failure to allege City Market's ownership or possession of the fire lane where 
the hazard was located is fatal to her premises liability claim.") 
Gonzalez's amended complaint can best be described as a "shotgun complaint." The 
amended complaint indiscriminately disperses general allegations against all defendants and 
then places the burden on each defendant and the Court to specifically identify which 
allegations potentially pertain to which defendant. In defense of his amended complaint, 
Gonzalez argues that that if any uncertainty existed, the burden was on RSC and the other 
defendants to ferret out the deficiencies and inaccuracies in Gonzalez's deficient pleading 
through motions or discovery. In essence, Gonzalez argues that RSC and the other parties 
should have filed costly motions and/or conduct time consuming discovery rather than have 
Gonzalez distinguish which allegations are directed to which defendant. Indeed, given the 
fact that Gonzalez readily admits that his premises liability claim is premised upon a legal 
theory that has not been adopted by a Utah Appellate Court, it is unclear exactly what 
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discovery RSC should have conducted. Gonzalez's position would require defendants to not 
only conduct discovery on legally recognized causes of action but to anticipate and conduct 
discovery on potential causes of action as well regardless of whether or not the cause of 
action is supported by existing law. Gonzalez's position undermines judicial economy and 
encourages needless motions and/or discovery and should be rejected by this Court. 
As mentioned above, this Court has previously held that a Plaintiffs failure to allege 
a defendant's ownership and possession is fatal to a premises liability claim. See, Hevelone 
v. City Market, Inc., 2005 UT App. 215. Gonzalez concedes that RSC was not an "owner" 
or "possessor" of land. See, Brief of Appellee at 33. Instead, Gonzalez argues that in RSC 
should have realized the possibility a premises liability claim could be predicated solely upon 
RSC's capacity as a general contractor, because as a general contractor, RSC's legal duties 
are "the same as" or "analogous to" that of an owner or possessor. Claiming that RSC should 
have realized that a general contractor's legal duties are "the same as" or "analogous to" that 
of an owner or possessor of land, implicitly assumes that Utah law recognizes such a legal 
duty. However, Gonzalez readily admits that Utah has not adopted such a legal duty. See, 
Brief of Appellee at 15. ("The only issue, therefore, is whether Utah would join the majority 
of jurisdictions in adopting §3 84. Sorenson correctly notes that the Utah Supreme Court has 
not yet done so.") This Court should reject Gonzalez's fallacious and circular reasoning. 
RSC could not have been on notice of a claim that even Gonzalez concedes has not been 
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recognized in Utah3. Consequently, the trial court's determination that Gonzalez sufficiently 
plead a premises liability claim against RSC5 notwithstanding the fact that such a claim is not 
adopted in Utah, is in error and should be reversed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah law is clear that RSC, as the general contractor on the Project, cannot be liable 
for the workplace injury of Gonzalez unless RSC exercised affirmative control over the 
injury causing aspect of Gonzalez' work. Gonzalez' attempt to recast his claims against RSC 
as direct negligence and premises liability fail as a matter of law, as they conflict with 
established Utah law. Utah has not adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts §384 and should 
not adopt it as it is in direct contravention of Utah's general rule of non-liability. Gonzalez's 
arguments on appeal concerning whether contact with a power line is a risk inherent in his 
work are inconsistent with his arguments to the trial court and are merely "straw man" 
arguments that should be disregarded by this Court. Because it is undisputed that RSC did 
not directly participate in Gonzalez's performance in the injury causing aspect of the work, 
the trial court erred in denying RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3
 The absurdity of Gonzalez's circular reasoning is further demonstrated in Issue 2 of 
Gonzalez's "Issues Presented on Appeal." See, Brief of Appellee at 2. Gonzalez argues 
that RSC failed to preserve the issue of whether Gonzalez adequately plead a premises 
liability cause of action because it was not raised until RSC's reply memorandum. In 
Utah, a reply memorandum is limited to "rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in 
opposition." See, Utah R. Civ. P. 7 (c)(l)(emphasis added). RSC's first notice of 
Gonzalez's premises liability claim came in Gonzalez's opposition to RSC's motion for 
summary Judgment and RSC was therefore entitled to rebut it. In rebutting this argument 
RSC properly preserved this issue for appeal. 
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Further, Gonzalez9 s attempt to impose landowner premises liability duties upon RSC, 
fail as Gonzalez failed to properly plead or give notice of his premises liability claim. 
Gonzalez5 s argument in defense of his deficient pleadings would require a party to anticipate 
causes of action that are not recognized by Utah Appellate Courts and are inconsistent with 
established Utah law. Furthermore, because Gonzalez failed to plead that RSC owned or 
possessed the property in question, his alleged premises liability claim fails as a matter of 
law. 
Based upon the foregoing, RSC respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district 
court's decision and direct the district court to grant RSC's Motion for Summary Judgment 
as a matter of law. 
DATED this LA ^day of July, 2011. 
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